Dynamical Networks of Influence in Small Group Discussions by Moussaid, Mehdi et al.
Dynamical​ ​Networks​ ​of​ ​Influence​ ​in​ ​Small 
Group​ ​Discussions  
Mehdi​ ​Moussaïd​1*​,​ ​Alejandro​ ​Noriega​ ​Campero​2​​ ​and​ ​Abdullah 
Almaatouq​2 
1​ ​​Center​ ​for​ ​Adaptive​ ​Rationality,​ ​Max​ ​Planck​ ​Institute​ ​for​ ​Human​ ​Development,​ ​Berlin,​ ​Germany.  
2​ ​​Massachusetts​ ​Institute​ ​of​ ​Technology,​ ​Cambridge,​ ​MA,​ ​USA. 
*Corresponding​ ​author:​ ​​moussaid@mpib-berlin.mpg.de 
 
 
Keywords​: Collective intelligence | Social influence | Social learning | Social structure |             
Group​ ​deliberation 
 
 
   
 
 Abstract 
 
In many domains of life, business and management, numerous problems are addressed by             
small groups of individuals engaged in face-to-face discussions. While research in social            
psychology has a long history of studying the determinants of small group performances, the              
internal dynamics that govern a group discussion is not yet well understood. Here, we rely               
on computational methods based on network analyses and opinion dynamics to described            
how individuals influence each other during a group discussion. We consider the situation in              
which a small group of three individuals engages in a discussion to solve an estimation task.                
We propose a model describing how group members gradually influence each other and             
revise their judgments over the course of the discussion. The main component of the model               
is an influence network — a weighted, directed graph that determines the extent to which               
individuals influence each other during the discussion. In simulations, we first study the             
optimal structure of the influence network that yields the best group performances. Then, we              
implement a social learning process by which individuals adapt to the past performance of              
their peers, thereby affecting the structure of the influence network in the long run. We               
explore the mechanisms underlying the emergence of efficient or maladaptive networks and            
show that the influence network can converge towards the optimal one, but only when              
individuals exhibit a social discounting bias by downgrading the relative performances of            
their peers. Finally, we find a late-speaker effect, whereby individuals who speak later in the               
discussion are perceived more positively in the long run and are thus more influential. The               
numerous predictions of the model can serve as a basis for future experiments, and this               
work​ ​opens​ ​research​ ​on​ ​small​ ​group​ ​discussion​ ​to​ ​computational​ ​social​ ​sciences.  
 
 
 
   
 
Introduction 
 
In many domains of life, complex problems can be successfully addressed by pooling             
the knowledge of several individuals ​[1,2]​. When making decisions, forming judgments, or            
solving multidimensional problems, groups of people can outperform the best individual in            
the group, and sometimes even the experts in the problem domain. In everyday life, this               
collective achievement is commonly accomplished by means of face-to-face group          
discussions, during which the exchange of information and ideas between people results in             
the emergence of accurate collective solutions ​[3]​. Whereas research in social psychology            
has a long history in studying the performances of small group discussions, more recent              
methods of computational social science are less often used to address this issue ​[4–7]​. In               
this context, the present article introduces a network approach to study the internal dynamics              
that​ ​operate​ ​during​ ​a​ ​group​ ​discussion. 
Given the omnipresence of group discussions in many areas of life, the factors             
impacting the performances of a group discussion have been extensively studied in the past.              
Classical research on group performance has highlighted numerous detrimental effects that           
can impair the quality of the discussion ​[3]​. For instance, the hidden profile effect refers to                
the situation where group members fail to share important private information and tend to              
focus mostly on the elements of information known by the majority of them ​[8,9]​. Likewise,               
groupthink and conformity are common issues that arise during discussions and occur when             
the group members ignore important facts or unwillingly adopt the judgment of others to              
reach a non-contentious collective consensus ​[10,11]​. Also, group discussions can be           
subject to polarization effects, in which the judgments of the individuals tend to become              
more extreme as a result of social interactions ​[12,13]​. Nevertheless, group discussions            
remain a powerful mean to aggregate the ideas and judgments of several people. In              
controlled experimental settings, it has been shown many times that groups can outperform             
single individuals in a wide variety of tasks, such as for detecting lies ​[14]​, reconstructing               
noisy signals ​[15]​, establishing a medical diagnosis ​[16]​, and in a variety of binary-choice              
tasks​ ​​[17]​.  
Yet, the conditions under which a group would perform good or bad remain unclear. In a                
recent series of experimental studies, Woolley et al. revealed the existence of a ‘collective              
intelligence factor’ that is predictive of groups performance across a wide variety of tasks ​[1]​.               
That factor is not associated with the average skills of the individual group members. Rather,               
it strongly correlates with the social sensitivity of the individuals, that is, their ability to listen                
 
and integrate the arguments of the others, and to balance the speaking turns across all               
group members. This suggests that one key aspect of group performance lies in the ​internal               
dynamics that operate during the discussion, more than in the individual skills of the group               
members. However, although the collective intelligence factor is a powerful indicator to            
anticipate the group’s performance, it does not explain the underlying causal mechanisms            
leading to collective good or bad performances. In fact, the ​dynamics of the group              
discussion, that is, the pattern of communication that takes place during the discussion and              
the​ ​social​ ​influences​ ​that​ ​operate​ ​among​ ​group​ ​members​ ​is​ ​not​ ​yet​ ​well​ ​understood. 
This dynamical aspect of collective intelligence has been deeply investigated in a different             
domain. In the past decade, computational social scientists have begun to understand more             
precisely the dynamics driving judgment formation and social contagion in large populations            
of people composed of hundreds of individuals connected in social networks ​[18–20]​.            
Numerical models have been proposed to describe how repeated interactions between a            
large number of individuals can possibly drive a population towards a consensual judgment,             
or on the contrary, polarize the beliefs of the crowd ​[13,21–23]​. These models generally rely               
on the assumption that agents tend to revise their judgments by averaging their own and               
their neighbors’ judgments, gradually converging towards a consensus. A similar averaging           
process has also been used in numerous models of advice-taking in psychology, this time at               
the scale of a dyad ​[24,25]​. Nevertheless, most existing research of opinion dynamics has              
dealt with large social networks, often focusing on how the network topology impacts the              
propagation of judgments. However, these methods have rarely been applied to the case of              
face-to-face discussions, where the group size is small — typically three to five individuals —               
and​ ​where​ ​all​ ​the​ ​individuals​ ​are​ ​interconnected​ ​in​ ​a​ ​full​ ​network. 
 
In the present work, we aim at describing the internal dynamics that operate during group               
discussions, using tools and concepts inherited from the network science and the            
computational social sciences. For this, we describe the group as a small social network in               
which each group member is represented by a node, and all the nodes are connected to one                 
another by weighted ties representing the extent to which individuals influence each other. In              
simulations, we show that the structure of this influence network determines the performance             
of the group during a group discussion. Importantly, we also assume that individuals can              
adapt the weight they assign to their peers after observing their past performances: Good              
performers tend to become more influential, and bad performers tend to lose influence in the               
group. Over time, the influence network evolves and often converge to the optimal structure.              
Crucially, this only happens when individuals exhibit a social discounting bias, that is, when              
 
people systematically downgrade the relative performances of their peers. Finally, we show            
that the speaking order has significant consequences on the emerging structure of the             
influence network, thus drawing links to the collective intelligence factor. The surprisingly            
complex dynamics that emerge from our simple model opens numerous experimental           
perspectives​ ​for​ ​future​ ​research. 
Model 
 
Discussion dynamics​. Our model describes the process of group discussions, in which ​N             
individuals undertake an estimation task collectively. Each individual ​i ​in the group has an              
initial estimate drawn from a normal distribution with mean and standard deviation .  xi
0         μ     σ  
The discussion is composed of speaking rounds across which the individuals     N r        
progressively revise their initial estimate. The estimate of the individual ​i at round ​r is noted                
. In each speaking round ​r​, a randomly selected individual speaks up and communicatesxi
r               
her current estimate to all the others. Every time an individual speaks up, all the other   xi
r               
group members revise their current estimate using a weighted average procedure (see, e.g.,             
[13,24,25]​. Formally, the revised estimate of the individual ​j after the individual ​i has spoken               
up​ ​is​ ​given​ ​by 
​ ​ . (x )xj
r = xj
r−1 + wij i
r − xj
r−1   
In the above equation, the term represents the weight that the individual ​j assigns to the      wij           
speaker ​i​. The weight is defined in the interval . According to the above equation, a         0 1][        
weight indicates that ​j ignores the judgment of ​i​, and a weight indicates that ​j wij = 0             wij = 1     
fully adopts the judgment of i​. The speaker does not revise her estimate in round , leading               r   
to​ ​ .​ ​The​ ​same​ ​process​ ​repeats​ ​round​ ​after​ ​round,​ ​until​ ​the​ ​last​ ​round​ ​ .xi
r = xi
r−1 r = N r   
The weights are not necessarily the same for all pairs of individuals and the weight is  wij               wij   
not necessarily identical to . Hence, the individuals are connected by an ​influence    wji    N        
network​, that is, a weighted directed graph that determines how group members influence             
one another during the discussion. The ​figure 1 illustrates the dynamics of a group              
discussion​ ​for​ ​two​ ​different​ ​influence​ ​networks.  
The above equation of social influence has been experimentally confirmed and used in             
numerous models of opinion dynamics (see, e.g. ​[12,13,21,23,25,26]​). Note that, in principle,            
the weight factors do not need to be bounded to the interval . Weights higher than 1   wij           0 1][      
or lower than 0 could represent more extreme social influence phenomena, such as social              
repulsion ( ) or over-adoption ( ) — which have potential to generate group wij < 0    wij > 1         
 
polarization ​[27]​. Nevertheless, we choose to restrict ourselves to weights varying in the             
interval in the present study for simplifying the traceability of the simulation results. 0 1][              
Another simplification of our model is that, in contrast to other formalizations ​[28]​, the              
weights are associated with a given ​person and not to a given ​argument ​that ​a person                
formulates. The model, therefore, assumes that some individuals are naturally more           
influential than others, rather than considering the persuasiveness of each communicated           
argument​ ​separately.  
Our approach differs from the simple averaging of the initial estimates that are typically used               
in the “wisdom-of-crowds,” and from the repeated averaging across all group members            
typically used in a DeGroot updating procedure ​[29]​. Here, individuals only integrate the             
estimate of the last speaker and do not average across all individuals simultaneously. This              
creates complex dynamics involving judgment propagation and indirect influence among          
group members. In the first part of the ‘Results’ section, we study the optimal structure of the                 
influence​ ​network​ ​for​ ​various​ ​group​ ​compositions.  
  
Social learning​. Our model does not only focus on the outcome of the discussion but also                
on how individuals adapt to it in the long run. For this, we assume that the ​same group of                   
individuals undertakes not only one, but a series of estimation tasks from the same         NT       
problem domain. For each estimation task, a new discussion takes place between the same              
set of individuals, following the procedure described in the previous section. For the first              
discussion, the group members are strangers and know nothing about each other’s skills.             
However, as individuals undertake repeated estimation tasks together, they can learn about            
and adapt to each other’s past performances. This social learning aspect is represented by a               
change in the weights that each individual gives to the others. In other words, the influence                
network​ ​evolves​ ​over​ ​time,​ ​depending​ ​on​ ​how​ ​the​ ​individuals​ ​perceive​ ​their​ ​peers.  
Formally, we now include a time dependency on the weights , where the variable          (t)wij     t  
varies from 1 to . The variable indicates the number of discussions that the pair of    NT    t           
individuals undertook together. Individuals who had no past interactions with their i, }{ j            
partner​ ​assign​ ​a​ ​default​ ​weight​ ​ ​ ​to​ ​him​ ​or​ ​her.(0)wij = w0   
Previous experimental measurements have shown that individuals update the weight          
assigned to others based on their relative, not absolute, performances ​[30]​. Furthermore,            
experimental data have also revealed the existence of a social discounting bias in this              
process, indicating that people tend to underweight their own error as compared to the errors               
of their partners ​[25,30,31]​. In our model, we describe these facts by assuming that the               
 
weight given by ​i to ​j is increased by an offset if ​j performed sufficiently better than ​i           w*         
during​ ​the​ ​previous​ ​discussion,​ ​and​ ​is​ ​decreased​ ​by​ ​ ​ ​otherwise:w*   
(t) w (t ) wwij =  ij − 1 +  *  if​ ​ ej* + α < ei
0  
And 
(t) w (t ) wwij =  ij − 1 −  *  if​ ​ ej* + α > ei
0  
Here, is the error that the focal individual ​i made on her initial estimate during the x |ei
0 = | i
0               xi
0    
previous discussion, and is the error that the individual ​j committed on the first   x |ej* = | j*             
communicated estimate during the previous discussion. This formalization reflects the fact           
that the focal individual ​i does not know what was the initial estimate of the individual ​j​,             xj
0      
and can only consider the first ​communicated estimate of the individual ​j to judge him or        xj*          
her. The parameter is the social discounting bias. The higher the stronger ​i downgrades   α         α      
the​ ​quality​ ​of​ ​​j​’s​ ​judgments. 
In the second part of the ‘Results’ section, we explore how the weights — and thus the             (t)wij      
structure of the influence network—evolve as ​t increases, and compare the emerging group             
structure​ ​to​ ​the​ ​optimal​ ​one. 
 
Results 
 
Optimal group configuration​. Ignoring the social learning aspect of the model for now (i.e.              
considering ), we addressed the question of what are the optimal weights that NT = 1            wij   
each individual should assign to all the others such that the group error is minimized. Is the                 
group better off by assigning equal weights to everybody, irrespective of the individual             
members’​ ​skills,​ ​or​ ​is​ ​it​ ​more​ ​efficient​ ​to​ ​give​ ​a​ ​stronger​ ​power​ ​to​ ​the​ ​best​ ​performers?  
To address this question, we varied the group composition by defining two types of              
individuals: 1) the good performers, for whom the initial estimates are drawn from a normal               
distribution with mean and standard deviation ; and 2) the bad performers, for whom   μ     σ+         
the initial estimates are drawn from a normal distribution with the same mean but a             μ    
standard deviation (​Figure S6​). We defined the group error as the average error  σ− > σ+        E      
of the group members at the end of the discussion: , where is the           / NE =  ∑
 
i
ei
N r   x |ei
N r = | i
N r    
final​ ​error​ ​of​ ​the​ ​individual​ ​​i​. 
 
Using an optimization procedure (see the Methods section), we computed the optimal            
network structure — that is, the weight values for all pairs — that minimizes the        wij     i, }{ j     
final error of the group for different group compositions. The results are presented in  E              
Figure 2​. Groups composed of equally skilled members (either good or bad performers)             
reach their best performances when individuals assign an equal weight to each          .2w ≈ 0    
other. When individuals do not perform equally, however, the weights need to be adjusted              
accordingly. For instance, in groups composed of two good and one bad performer, the              
group performs best when the two good performers assign a weight to one another           .2wij ≈ 0     
while ignoring the bad performer, but at the same time receiving a weight from her.             .7wij ≈ 0    
In the next section, we study whether groups can naturally converge towards these optimal              
structures​ ​via​ ​social​ ​learning.  
 
Emerging patterns​. Next, we addressed the question of whether groups can self-organize            
to reach the optimal structures described in ​Figure 2​. For this, we conducted another set of                
simulations, this time allowing for social learning across a series of discussions.           00NT = 1   
For each group composition, we also varied the value of the social discounting bias in the              α    
interval . For all values of , we measured the average group performance after 0  2][      α         
discussions, for different group compositions. Surprisingly, we found that the best00NT = 1             
collective performances are found for a social discounting bias (​Figure 3​). That is,         α > 0      
individuals do benefit from moderately downgrading the performances of their peers. To            
better understand this result, we looked at the associated network structures for three values              
of ( , , and ). The results are shown in ​figure 4​. It is visible from this α  α = 0  .1α = 0   α = 1              
figure that in the absence of bias (i.e., ) the weights that individuals assign to each        α = 0         
other are too high. However, increasing the bias tends to reduce the overall weight values.               
When the social discounting bias is large enough, the weights of the influence networks              
match the optimal ones presented in ​figure 2​, and yield the best group performances shown               
in​ ​​figure​ ​3​.  
Why do people benefit from downgrading the performances of their peers? Social            
discounting is necessary to counterbalance the fact that individuals tend to ​overestimate ​the             
skills of their peers. The reason is that individuals judge the performance of the others based                
on the first estimate they communicated, which is generally better than their real initial    xi*            
estimate . For instance, in the illustrative discussion dynamics sketched in Figure 1A, the xi
0              
individual (in yellow) communicates her first estimate at round 4. This estimate is very p3        x*3         
close to the true value, giving the impression that is an excellent performer. However, the         p3        
 
actual initial estimate of was far off. Because the initial estimate was not   x03   p3         x
0
3    
communicated, the other group members could only judge the performance of based on           p3    
and thus overestimated her skills. Generally speaking, the first communicated estimatex*3             
tends to be more accurate than the initial estimate , because has been revised inxi*           xi
0   xi*      
light of what the others have communicated before ​[2,32]​. For that reason, the weights are               
usually too high when (Figure 4). Social discounting can correct this overestimation    α = 0          
and​ ​is​ ​therefore​ ​beneficial​ ​to​ ​the​ ​group​ ​members. 
 
Speaking​ ​order​ ​effect​. 
One important side effect of the above mechanism is that individuals who tend to speak for                
the first time later in the discussion are more likely to be positively perceived by their peers.                 
In fact, one can remain silent during the beginning of the discussion, integrate the estimates               
communicated by the others, and speak up later to communicate a revised and more              
accurate estimate to the rest of the group. This would have the effect of giving others the                 
impression that the late speaker is a good performer. We evaluated the late-speaker effect              
in an additional series of simulations, by manipulating the round at which one group member               
speaks up for the first time. As predicted, the average weight that the individual ​j           (N )wij T      
receives from the others after discussions is significantly increased as ​j speaks for the     NT           
first time later in the discussion (​Figure 5A​). The late-speaker effect is attenuated for the               
calibrated​ ​values​ ​of​ ​ ,​ ​but​ ​does​ ​not​ ​disappear​ ​completely..1α = 0   
This result contrasts with the empirical fact that the individual who speaks first in a group                
deliberation have a stronger impact on the outcome of the discussion (generally known as              
the anchoring bias; see e.g., ​[33]​). Interestingly, this “first-speaker” effect is also visible from              
our simulations (​Figure 5B​). In fact, the first-speaker and late-speaker effects are not             
incompatible: On the one hand, individuals who speak early during a discussion have a              
stronger influence ​on that discussion. On the other hand, however, individuals who speak             
late during a discussion have the stronger influence in the long run, because they tend to                
receive​ ​greater​ ​weights​ ​from​ ​others.  
 
Discussion 
 
Based on methods inspired by network science and opinion dynamics, we studied how the              
internal structure of a group could emerge and shape the group’s collective performances.             
For this, we introduced the influence network — a weighted, directed graph that determines              
 
the extent to which each group member influences the others. We showed that the structure               
and the evolution of that influence network could be a major determinant of group              
performance: Groups perform well when their internal structure reflects the skills of the group              
members well, but perform poorly otherwise. It is also interesting to compare the             
performances of face-to-face discussions with those of other methods of collective           
intelligence such as the wisdom-of-the-crowds approach (WOC). In contrast to face-to-face           
discussions, the WOC computes the average estimate of the group members in the absence              
of any social interactions ​[34]​. Our additional simulations (see supplementary ​figure S7​)            
show that the WOC outperforms the group discussion when the skills of the group members               
are similar. However, for groups composed of a mixture of good and bad performers, the               
discussion outperforms the WOC on the long-run because the group members will            
eventually find out who are the best performers and follow them while ignoring the              
judgments of the bad performers. In other words, groups can adapt to the skills of the group                 
members whereas the WOC averages across everybody’s estimates irrespective of their           
individual​ ​skills.  
In the context of group discussions, previous experimental studies have revealed the            
existence of a ‘collective intelligence factor’ — called ​c — that is predictive of groups               
performance ​[1]​. The authors of that study have shown that ​c ​correlates with the social               
sensitivity of the individuals, as measured by the ‘Reading the mind in the eyes’ test ​[35]​.                
That is, groups composed of individuals with higher social sensitivity tend to perform better              
than those with lower social sensitivity. An important question would then be whether this              
correlation between the social sensitivity of the individuals and the group’s performance            
could be explained by the structure of the group’s influence network. It is conceivable that               
individuals with a higher social sensitivity have a better ability to perceive the skills of their                
peers and to adjust the weights they give them during a discussion and in the long run. On                  
the contrary, individuals with a lower social sensitivity would fail to adequately balance the              
weight they give to one another and produce maladaptive influence networks leading to poor              
collective​ ​performances.  
Another important component of the collective intelligence factor is the ability of the group              
members to take conversational turns equally. Experiments have shown that groups where a             
few people dominate the conversation are outperformed by those with an equal distribution             
of speaking turns. In our simulations, however, all individuals have equal probability to speak              
up at each discussion round, and the impact of unbalanced speaking turns was not explored.               
The reason is that the relationship between an individual’s skills, social influence, and             
speaking frequency is unclear. The speaking probability can be affected by the individual’s             
 
skills, or by the individual’s status in the influence network. This aspect of the discussion               
dynamics​ ​needs​ ​to​ ​be​ ​evaluated​ ​experimentally.  
In sum, our simple model produces a rich set of predictions that could constitute important               
explanations to existing research on group discussion. This work calls for a series of              
experimental studies that would (1) validate the predictions, (2) test the relationship with the              
individual’s social sensitivity, and (3) evaluate the determinants of the speaking frequency.            
With that regards, novel technological tools such as the sociometric badges recording            
people’s speaking frequency could help measuring the internal dynamics that take place            
during a group discussion ​[36,37]​. The model can open numerous perspectives aimed at             
enhancing the collective performances of groups in all situations where people engage in             
face-to-face discussions for solving problems or making decisions. This applies to many            
domains of life including the business and industry, scientific research, politics and medical             
decision-making. 
 
Methods 
The optimal influence networks presented in figure 2 were computed through an exhaustive             
search optimization procedure. For each of the four group compositions presented in figure             
2, we systematically varied the six weight values of the network in the interval [0 1], with                 
steps of 0.2. In such a way, we tested a total of 46656 different configurations for each group                  
composition. For each configuration, we measured the average group error across 5000            
discussions. The best 30 configurations that produced the smaller group errors were then             
merged by averaging the weights across them. The six resulting weights are those     wij          
presented​ ​in​ ​figure​ ​2.  
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1​: Illustrative examples of group discussions with ​N​=3 individuals​. (A)           
Simulation with a balanced influence network (represented on the left side), in which all              
group members assign the same weight to all other group members. In our      .3wij = 0         
representation of the influence network, the arrows pointing from an individual ​i to another              
individual ​j represent the influence that ​i ​has on the judgment of ​j​. The corresponding               
discussion dynamics is depicted on the right side. The color stars indicate the identity of the                
speaker at each round of the discussion. The initial judgments of the three individuals for this                
simulation are , , and . ​At round , the individual 2 (in red)   .6x 01 = 0  .3x02 = 0   − .8x
0
3 = 0    r = 1       
speaks up and communicates her judgment ​to the two others. Individuals 1 and 3 revise      x02           
their own judgment accordingly, leading to and . After 10 rounds of      .5x11 = 0   − .47x
1
3 = 0      
discussion, the judgments of the three individuals converge around . In each round,         .2x = 0     
the identity of the speaker is randomly chosen among the ​N individuals. (B) The same               
simulation assuming a more hierarchical influence network. In this case, the individual 1 is              
more influential than the two others. During the discussion, the judgments of the three              
individuals converge around . To facilitate the comparison between (A) and (B), the   .6x = 0           
initial​ ​judgments​ ​and​ ​the​ ​sequence​ ​of​ ​speakers​ ​are​ ​identical​ ​in​ ​both​ ​examples. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2​: Normative group structures​. Optimal networks of influence for different group            
composition and . Good performers draw their initial judgments from a normal  N = 3           
distribution with mean and standard deviation , whereas bad performers draw   μ = 0     σ+ = 1      
their initial judgments from a normal distribution with mean and standard deviation         μ = 0     
(see ​figure S6​). (A) When all group members are good performers, the bestσ− = 5               
collective performance is found when all individuals assign the same weight to all           .2wij ≈ 0    
others. (B) In groups composed of two good performers and one bad performer (here is              p3   
the bad performer, depicted in red), the group performs best when the two good performers               
assign a weight to one another while ignoring the bad performer, but at the same   .2wij ≈ 0              
time receiving a weight from her. (C) In groups composed of two bad performers    .7wij ≈ 0            
and one good performer (here is the good performer), the best collective performance is     p1           
found when receives a strong weight from the two others while at the same time  p1      .9wij = 0           
ignoring them. The two bad performers give each other a weight of 0.5. (D) When all group                 
members are bad performers, the best collective performance is found when all individuals             
assign the same weight to all others, similar to (A). The width of the arrows is    .2wij ≈ 0              
proportional​ ​to​ ​ ,​ ​that​ ​is,​ ​the​ ​weight​ ​given​ ​by​ ​​j​​ ​to​ ​the​ ​judgment​ ​of​ ​​i​.wij  
 
 
 
Figure 3​: Impact of the social discounting bias​. The average error of the group as a                
function of the social discounting bias. For different group compositions (i.e. (A) three good              
performers, (B) two good and one bad performers, (C) one good and two bad performers,               
and (D) three bad performers) the error curves are non-monotonic. This result indicates that              
a positive social discounting bias is beneficial to the group performance. Blue dashed lines              
indicate the average performance of groups that are structured with the optimal weights             
presented​ ​in​ ​​figure​ ​2​. 
 
 
Figure 4​: Emerging group structures​. Networks of influence for different group           
compositions, as they emerged in simulations after t=100 successive discussions. At the end             
of each discussion, each group member could update the weights given to all others, based               
on their relative errors in the previous discussion. Over time, the weights gradually             
converged to the above values. Here, the composition of the group is varied (a good               
performer is represented in blue whereas a bad performer is represented in red), as well as                
the social discounting bias . When the majority of group members are good performers    α           
(i.e., 3 or 2 blue dots), a small bias of yields the best performances (see figures 3A          .1α = 0         
and 3B) and produces networks of influence similar to the normative ones (see figure 2).               
When the majority of group members are bad performers (i.e., 2 or 3 red dots), larger bias of                  
​ ​is​ ​preferable,​ ​producing​ ​networks​ ​similar​ ​to​ ​the​ ​normative​ ​ones.α = 1   
 
 
 Figure 5​: Speaking order effects​. (A) Average weight received by group members after             
100 consecutive discussions, as a function of their first speaking round within each             
discussion. Individuals who speak later during the discussion tend to receive a stronger             
weight in the long run. The late speaker effect is attenuated by stronger biases. Results are                
averaged across 1000 simulations. (B) Within a discussion, individuals who speak earlier            
have a stronger impact on the outcome of that discussion. The first speaker effect is               
amplified when the weight assigned to the speaker is greater. Results are averaged across              
1000​ ​simulations.  
 
 
   
 
 
 
xi
r   Estimate​ ​of​ ​individual​ ​​i​​ ​at​ ​round​​ ​r 
xi
0   Initial​ ​estimate​ ​of​ ​individual​​ ​i 
 N   Group​ ​size 
 e i
r
  Error​ ​associated​ ​with​ ​the​ ​estimate​ ​ xi
r   
wij   Weight​ ​given​ ​by​ ​individual​ ​​i​ ​​to​ ​the​ ​estimates​ ​of individual​ ​​j​. 
 α   Social​ ​discounting​ ​bias 
,  μ σ   Mean​ ​and​ ​standard​ ​deviation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​normal 
distribution​ ​from​ ​which​ ​the​ ​individuals’​ ​initial 
estimates​ ​are​ ​drawn. 
 N r   Number​ ​of​ ​speaking​ ​rounds​ ​in​ ​a​ ​discussion 
NT   Number​ ​of​ ​discussions.  
 t   Current​ ​discussion 
 w0   Default​ ​weight​ ​assigned​ ​to​ ​a​ ​stranger 
 w*   Change​ ​of​ ​weights​ ​between​ ​discussions 
xi*  
First​ ​estimate​ ​communicated​ ​by​ ​i​ ​during​ ​the 
discussion.  
 
 
Table​ ​1​:​ ​ ​Model​ ​variables​ ​and​ ​parameters 
 
 
  
 
Supplementary​ ​figures 
 
 
Figure S6​: Performance of the agents​. In the simulations, good performers have their             
initial estimate randomly drawn from a normal distribution with a mean 0 and standard  x0              
deviation 1 (blue distribution). Bad performers draw their initial estimate from a normal          x0     
distribution with a mean 0 and standard deviation 5. Estimates are assumed to be              
normalized such that the truth always equals 0. In such a way, the error ​e associated with a                  
given​ ​estimate​ ​​x​​ ​is​ ​simply​ ​given​ ​by​ ​ .x|e = |  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure S7​: Wisdom-of-the-crowds​. Comparison between the performances of the group          
discussions and the wisdom-of-the-crowds approach (WOC) for different group compositions          
and over 100 learning rounds. The WOC is evaluated by measuring the error of the average                
estimate of the group members before the discussion starts. The WOC does not involve              
interaction between group members and is therefore identical across all learning rounds for             
a given group compositions. In contrast, the performance of the group discussions depends             
on the weights that the group members assigned to one another and therefore change over               
learning rounds. When all group members are equally skilled (either all good or all bad), the                
discussion is outperformed by the WOC (in A and D). However, when there exist skill               
differences within the group (in B and C), the discussion eventually outperforms the WOC              
 
because group members gradually learn to rely on the judgment of their best performers,              
whereas the WOC weights the judgments of the good and bad performers equally. Results              
are​ ​averaged​ ​over​ ​5000​ ​simulations,​ ​with​ ​ ​ ​and​ ​ .N = 3 α = 0  
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